Sebastian Arechaga
Ph.D. in Business and Public Policy
University of California, Berkeley
University of Chicago
emails to: sarechag@gmail.com
Full name: Sebastian Arechaga Garces
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Sebastian Arechaga
University of Chicago
Hi, I am Sebastian Arechaga, a Postdoctoral Fellow at the University of Chicago.
Hi, I am Sebastian Arechaga, a Postdoctoral Fellow at the University of Chicago.
I received my Ph.D. in Business and Public Policy from the University of California, Berkeley.
I use experimental and quasi-experimental methods to study empirical questions in public, labor, and personnel economics, as well as electoral preferences. My research focuses on incentive and public policy design, with a particular interest in education and the public sector. My current work studies teacher performance incentives, educational inequality, and the role of teachers in shaping student outcomes. Other projects examine political behavior among public-sector workers, local government redistribution, workers' responses to incentives, and voters' policy preferences.
Contact Information
Email: sarechaga@uchicago.edu
Phone: +1 (510) 833 8197
Job Market Paper
Performance-based incentives in the public sector often raise concerns that they may exacerbate inequality by disproportionately benefiting already advantaged localities. I study the Teacher Incentive Allotment program (TIA), a statewide performance-pay reform introduced in Texas in 2019 that provides substantial bonuses to highly effective teachers, with larger payments in schools serving more disadvantaged students. Exploiting the staggered rollout of TIA across nearly 440 districts and 3,000 schools, I estimate its effects on student achievement and how those effects vary across schools. TIA increased standardized test scores by 0.065 standard deviations in mathematics and 0.057 standard deviations in reading at the average school. Achievement gains were substantially larger in schools with higher vulnerability scores, reducing the achievement gap associated with school socioeconomic disadvantage by approximately 6 to 10%. These results show that a large-scale performance-pay program can increase average achievement while disproportionately benefiting disadvantaged schools, providing evidence on how the design of public-sector incentives can shape both productivity and inequality.
Work in Progress
What Drives Teachers' Electoral Engagement
I use data from teacher school rosters and records of contributions to parties to examine the following questions: Do teachers free-ride on others' contributions? Are they more responsive to the contributions of peers or neighbors? To what extent is teachers' contribution to parties affected by school districts?
Teachers' Contribution to Parties and School Performance in the Electoral Cycles
Using data from teacher school rosters, standardized test scores, and records of contributions to parties, I examine the patterns of contributions among teachers and its relationship with student academic performance. My analysis reveals that, in the post-COVID-19 period, teachers have made significantly more contributions than individuals in other occupations. Notably, teachers that contribute are often found in schools with lower test scores. The causal impact of teacher electoral participation on student achievement remains an area of ongoing research.
Government Size and Ideology. The Case of California Local Bond Measures
In California, local governments must obtain voter approval through ballot measures to issue general obligation bonds backed by property taxes, particularly for school and infrastructure projects. These ballots specify how the funds will be used, providing a clear link between voters’ political preferences and their support for different sizes of government. Using precinct-level data from school finance ballot measures in the largest California counties, I document two main findings. First, precincts with more conservative electorates are less likely to approve bonds and property tax increases. Second, these same precincts exhibit higher voter turnout in such elections.
In ongoing work, I develop a model that rationalizes these patterns by incorporating uncertainty about the benefits of proposed spending and the relative certainty of its fiscal costs. The model aims to explain how ideological preferences and perceived risk shape voter behavior toward local government size and public investment.
Maternal Leave, Childcare, and the Careers of Public-Sector Workers
This project studies how expanding maternal leave and access to childcare shape the careers and productivity of women working in the public sector. We focus on a recent policy change in Minnesota, where paid maternal leave for public employees increased from 6 to 12 weeks. Using detailed administrative data, we examine how this reform affects key labor decisions, including contract continuation, job mobility, long-term career progression, and measures of worker performance.
This question is particularly relevant as this state prepares for a major update to maternal leave legislation in 2026. By following workers before and after the reform, the project provides evidence on whether expanded family support policies improve retention and help women advance in public institutions.
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